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Sammendrag:. Selv om det eksisterer en omfattende 
litteratur både om internasjonale forhandlinger og om 
hvordan internasjonale avtaler kan håndheves, er det 
hittil gjort lite forskning om hvordan forhandlinger og 
håndhevingsmekanismer påvirker hverandre gjensidig. 
Et viktig unntak er Fearon (1998), som modellerer 
internasjonalt samarbeid som en to-trinnsprosess, der 
partenes atferd i forhandlingsprosessen påvirkes av 
vissheten om at avtalen må håndheves av partene selv. 
I dette notatet utvikles en alternativ modell for denne 
typen interaksjon, med den grønne utviklings-
mekanismen som eksempel. Som hos Fearon 
modelleres håndhevingsfasen som et uendelig gjentatt 
Fangens dilemma-spill. Men mens Fearon betrakter 
forhandlingsfasen som et utmattelsesspill, modelleres 
denne fasen her som et sekvensielt forhandlingsspill 
av typen Ståhl-Rubinstein. Modellens implikasjoner 
sammenlignes med resultatene fra Ståhl-Rubinstein-
modellen og også med resultatene fra Fearons modell. 
En noe overraskende konklusjon er at det forhold at 
partene selv må håndheve avtalen bidrar til å gjøre 
utfallet av forhandlingene mer symmetrisk enn det 
ellers ville være. Forhandlingsstyrke er således mindre 
viktig hvis partene er overlatt til seg selv enn det er 
hvis det finnes en tredjepart (f.eks. en domstol) som 
sørger for å håndheve avtalen. 
 
Abstract: While there is a vast literature both on 
international bargaining and on how international 
agreements can be enforced, very little work has been 
done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An 
important exception is Fearon (1998), who models 
international cooperation as a two-stage process in 
which the bargaining process is constrained by a need 
for decentralized enforcement (meaning that the 
agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves 
rather than a third party, such as a court). Using the 
Clean Development Mechanism as an example, the 
present paper proposes a different model of this kind 
of interaction. The model follows Fearon’s in so far as 
we both use the infinitely repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma to capture the enforcement phase of the 
game. However, while Fearon depicts the bargaining 
stage as a War of Attrition, the present model sees that 
stage as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-
Rubinstein type. The implications of the present model 
are compared both to those of the Ståhl-Rubinstein 
model and to those of the Fearon model. A surprising 
conclusion is that a need for decentralized 
enforcement tends to make the bargaining outcome 
more symmetrical than otherwise. Thus, the impact of 
bargaining power is actually smaller when the 
resulting agreement must be enforced by the parties 
themselves than it is if enforcement is taken care of by 
a third party. 
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1 Introduction 
Much of the literature on international cooperation can be placed in two main categories. One 
focuses on bargaining – the process of reaching agreement. Scholars working in this field tend 
to ask if certain bargaining outcomes are more likely than others, given a particular setting. 
After the fact, they ask why the solution actually reached in a specific context came to be 
chosen over other potential outcomes.1 The second category investigates the conditions under 
which international agreements can be enforced, given the anarchic character of the 
international system. Work of this kind typically focuses on the means by which states try to 
sustain the outcome of a bargaining process.2 
Although there is a vast body of literature in either of these two categories, very little work 
exists on how bargaining and enforcement interact. A notable exception is Fearon (1998), 
who studies how the need for enforcement might constrain the outcome of a bargaining 
process. For this purpose, Fearon uses the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma to model the 
enforcement stage, portraying the bargaining stage as a War of Attrition. 
The present paper proposes a different model of the interaction between enforcement and 
bargaining. The model resembles Fearon’s in so far as they both use the infinitely repeated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma to model the enforcement stage. However, the bargaining stage is 
modeled in a different way. Instead of using the War of Attrition to portray this stage, the 
Ståhl-Rubinstein (S-R) sequential bargaining model is used.3 The question posed is similar to 
that of Fearon: How do the restrictions imposed by the enforcement stage affect the 
bargaining outcome? In particular, I ask how the need for decentralized enforcement 
influences the distribution of the fruits of cooperation. The surprising answer is that it makes 
the bargaining outcome more symmetrical than it is in the S-R model. In other words, the 
impact of bargaining power turns out to be smaller if the parties must enforce the agreement 
themselves than it is if the agreement is enforced by a third party.  
Even if the basic idea is quite general, I find it convenient to present the model in terms of a 
concrete example, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).4 It is not yet clear to 
what extent CDM projects will have to be enforced in a decentralized manner.5 The model 
presented here suggests that this decision is likely to have a bearing on how the gains from 
CDM projects are distributed between the parties. Surprisingly, decentralized enforcement 
tends to induce a more symmetric division of the gains than does centralized enforcement. In 
other words, there is less room for bargaining power if the parties must enforce CDM 
                                                     
1 For a brief review of the literature on international bargaining, see Hopmann (1996, ch. 3). 
2 This literature includes parts of the neo-neo-debate, e.g., Baldwin (1993), Grieco (1990, 1993), 
Morrow (1997), Powell (1991, 1993, 1994) and Snidal (1991a, 1991b, 1993), as well as the huge 
amount of work on cooperation under anarchy. Classics in the latter literature are Axelrod (1984), 
Kreps et. al. (1982), Oye (1986), Taylor (1976, 1987) and Shubik (1970).  
3 This model has been extremely popular in economic applications of bargaining theory. Applications 
to international relations include Fearon (1995), Powell (1996) and Wagner (1996).  
4 A potential problem with this example is that many CDM projects are one-off rather than repeated in 
nature. This makes the assumption of depicting the enforcement stage as an infinitely repeated game 
problematic. In practice, however, decentralized enforcement may involve punishment on other issues 
as well. Hence, it may be useful to think of the parties’ moves in the enforcement stage as a choice 
between cooperation and non-cooperation that is not necessarily limited to CDM projects. 
5 At the earliest, agreement on a binding enforcement regime will be adopted at the first Meeting of the 
Parties following the entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Relatively optimistic observers expect 
this to happen some time in 2002.  
CICERO Working Paper 2001:12 
Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining, and the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
2
agreements themselves, than if enforcement is ensured by a third party such as the 
enforcement branch of the climate regime’s compliance mechanism. Assuming that the 
bargaining advantage will typically rest with the industrial country, this may be seen as good 
news from the point of view of developing countries. 
The present model has at least two distinct advantages over Fearon’s model. First, while 
Fearon construes the bargaining process as a struggle over just two competing proposals, the 
S-R model allows for a continuum of bargaining outcomes. When, as in this paper, the main 
purpose is to analyze the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, the latter is clearly the 
preferable solution. Second, another unsatisfactory feature of Fearon’s model is that it uses 
continuous time in the bargaining stage, but discrete time in the enforcement stage. This 
problem is avoided in the present model, as both stages are pictured in discrete time. 
These two advantages do have a price, however. A counterintuitive feature of the S-R 
model is that agreement is always achieved instantaneously. Although the (potential) length 
of the bargaining process is nevertheless a central parameter in the model and an important 
determinant of the predicted bargaining outcome, the assumption that in equilibrium 
agreement is always reached immediately makes the model unfit to study a contest of nerves 
of the type that is sometimes characteristic of the final stages of international bargaining 
processes. At that point, it is indeed often the case that two proposals confront each other, 
threatening a breakdown unless one of the parties backs down. 
These observations suggest that the two models have different applications and are 
therefore best seen as complementary rather than competing. Fearon’s model is more 
appropriate for the purpose of deciding which side is likely to prevail in a contest of nerves. 
The present model is likely to be more useful if the aim is to predict which party will be able 
to claim the larger share of the fruits of cooperation, or how particular parameters tend to 
influence the parties’ payoffs. Used together, the two models offer a better and fuller 
understanding of the impact of anarchy on bargaining outcomes than either of the two models 
used alone. 
The main parts of this paper focus on a version of the model that assumes complete 
information. Some may object that some of the model’s parameters (notably the parties’ 
discount factors) are unlikely to be common knowledge, meaning that a model based on 
incomplete information would be more appropriate. I agree. However, as I need to compare 
my results to those of the S-R and Fearon models, it is only sensible to retain as much as 
possible from those models and vary only the factors of principal interest. These factors are 
the means of enforcement (vis-à-vis the S-R model) and the structure of the bargaining stage 
(vis-à-vis Fearon). As the assumption of complete information is made both in the S-R model 
and in Fearon’s model,6 the bulk of the present paper relies on that assumption as well. 
However, Appendix C indicates how incomplete information can be incorporated into the 
model, and shows how this affects some of the model’s implications. 
The paper is organized as follows. The Clean Development Mechanism is briefly explained 
in section two. Section three presents the model, portraying international cooperation as a 
two-stage process. It begins with a bargaining stage, where the parties determine the terms of 
cooperation. Once an agreement is reached, the parties move on to the enforcement stage, 
where they seek to implement and sustain that agreement. In the fourth section, I solve the 
model and explore how the need for enforcement affects the bargaining outcome in 
                                                     
6 Fearon makes a brief note on incomplete information, but the bulk of his article is based on a 
complete information model. 
9  See Hagem (1997:433ff.) for a more thorough discussion of the first three problems mentioned here.  
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equilibrium. Finally, the fifth section discusses some of the model’s main implications and 
compares the results to those of the S-R and Fearon models.  
2 Example: the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol 
Although the relevance of the present model is quite general, it is convenient to have a 
specific application in mind. The example chosen here is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of this mechanism is to allow countries listed in 
Annex I of the Protocol (i.e., industrial countries) to obtain additional emission quotas by 
financing specific measures that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in developing 
countries (which are not included in Annex I). The principal legal basis for the CDM is found 
in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The first three sections of the Article state that: 
1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. 
2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist 
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development 
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3. 
3. Under the clean development mechanism: 
Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities 
resulting in certified emission reductions; and 
Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions 
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with 
part of their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
 
Arrangements of this kind are often portrayed as having a number of advantages (Bohm 
1994b:5). First, they enhance efficiency by allowing a given amount of resources to produce a 
larger reduction of carbon emissions than otherwise. Conversely, a given reduction of 
emissions may be obtained at a lower cost. Thus, for a given overall emission level, the CDM 
can make each party better off than it would have been if all emission-reducing projects were 
implemented individually. Second, since abatement is generally less costly with joint than 
with individual implementation, the CDM makes it easier for individual countries to accept 
more ambitious targets for abatement. Finally, it has been argued that, for the above reasons, 
the CDM is likely to enhance the chances of more general agreements on abatement. 
However, agreements based on the CDM are not without difficulties. At least four 
problems may be distinguished.9 First, it may be difficult to estimate the net effect of a CDM 
project. Emissions are constantly changing, meaning that an estimate is needed of a baseline 
for emissions in the host country in the absence of the CDM project. A second problem is that 
potential host firms might be induced to act strategically. The hope of being offered a 
profitable CDM contract might cause them to postpone investments in less polluting 
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technology, causing adverse effects on global emissions. Third, transaction costs connected 
with negotiation, implementation and monitoring of CDM agreements may be considerable. 
As a consequence, potential gains from cooperation may be seriously reduced or even 
completely offset. Finally, it is far from obvious how schemes of joint implementation can be 
enforced. It may be tempting for a developing country to try to cash in a side payment without 
delivering (in full) the promised investment. Conversely, an industrialized country might be 
tempted to hold back (part of) the agreed-upon side payment, hoping that the developing 
country might nevertheless deliver the agreed-upon investment. In addition, there is the 
possibility that the parties might join forces to make imaginary contracts that seemingly 
satisfy the industrialized country’s obligations under the Kyoto protocol, while actually 
achieving nothing in terms of reducing carbon emissions. Avoiding this type of cheating 
could require vast resources being used for monitoring. 
3 The Model 
The model consists of two stages. At the first stage, the parties bargain in order to set the 
terms of agreement. At the second, they implement that agreement and select strategies to 
enforce it. 
Consider a project designed to reduce carbon emissions that, if implemented, would meet 
part of country C’s emission reduction target under the Kyoto protocol.  The project can be 
implemented by country C itself, at cost CC , but it may also be implemented by another 
country I, at cost IC , where CC > IC .10 This means that both countries benefit if they are able 
to reach (and enforce) an agreement whereby, first, the project is implemented by I, and, 
second, I receives a side payment X from C. Country C would then gain CC - X, while country 
I would gain X - IC , compared to a situation where the relevant project is implemented by 
country C itself and no side payment is made. 
In the bargaining stage, the parties determine the size of the side payment X. Clearly, any 
candidate for a final agreement has to satisfy CC X  IC , since a proposal outside this range 
would make one of the parties worse off with an agreement than without it. Thus that party 
would rationally choose not to consent to it. In other words, only agreements satisfying this 
requirement belong to the bargaining set. 
The bargaining stage will here be depicted as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-
Rubinstein type (Ståhl 1972, Rubinstein 1982).11 In this model, two parties get to share a pie 
if they are able to agree on how to share it. In the present context, the “pie” corresponds to 
CC - IC . At date 0, one of the countries proposes a side payment x 0  in [ IC , CC ], and the other 
party either accepts or refuses. For the sake of comparability, I suppose throughout that 
country I makes the first proposal. If country C accepts, it obtains CC - x 0 , leaving x 0 - IC  for 
country I. If country C refuses, it makes a new proposal x 1 at date 1, in which country I gets 
x 1 - IC  if it accepts. If country I refuses, it gets to make yet another proposal x 2  at date 2, 
and so forth. In this manner, the countries alternate making offers until either one of them 
accepts the opponent’s proposal or the time available for bargaining runs out. In the S-R 
model, the payoffs are  tI (x t - IC ) for country I and  tC ( CC - x t ) for country C if the parties 
                                                     
10 It may be useful to think of country C (“Compensator”) as an industrialized country, and country I 
(“Implementor”) as a developing country.  
11 The following exposition is based on Hovi (1992:162-163), which in turn draws heavily on Sutton 
(1986:710-712) and Tirole (1988:430). 
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agree at date t on a side payment of x t . If no agreement is reached, both sides receive a zero 
payoff. The discount factors  j  (j=C,I) apply to the bargaining stage only, and are assumed to 
satisfy 0< j <1. It may be noted that the bargaining stage is not only a game of complete 
information, but also one of perfect information. 
Once the parties have reached an agreement, they enter the second stage of the game: the 
enforcement stage.12 In other words, the sooner they reach an agreement, the sooner they can 
begin to enjoy the fruits of cooperation.13 Implicitly, the S-R model assumes that any 
agreement is enforced automatically and without cost. This could mean, for example, that 
there is an institution such as a court that can be relied upon to automatically enforce any 
agreement the parties might reach, free of charge. Of course, this is usually unrealistic even in 
a national setting, as not all disputes can be brought before a court, and legal proceedings are 
typically costly. Assuming that the parties are states, however, the assumption of automatic 
and costless enforcement is even more unrealistic. Granted, even at the international level, the 
parties can in theory often refer a dispute to a third party, either a permanent court or an 
institution established by the parties themselves to ensure compliance. For example, the 
climate regime will include a compliance mechanism for this purpose. In practice, however, 
international institutions rarely have the power to enforce their decisions. And even if they do, 
it is not always credible that they are prepared to use them. Among other things, this could 
cause the relevant party to exit the agreement. In the case of CDM, the compliance 
mechanism of the emerging regime on climate change is primarily designed to enforce 
emission quotas. It is less clear if it can also be used to enforce the terms of CDM contracts. It 
is not unrealistic, therefore, to assume that such contracts must be enforced by the signatories 
themselves. I shall call this decentralized enforcement, whereas enforcement by an institution 
(or another third party) will be referred to as centralized. 
The enforcement stage of the model consists of an infinite number of periods. In each 
period country I decides whether to implement a project and country C decides whether to 
make the side payment that was agreed upon in the bargaining stage. The periodic payoffs in 
the enforcement stage are shown in Figure 1. All payoffs represent gains and losses compared 
to a situation where the project is implemented individually by country C (and no side 
payment is therefore made). It is assumed that each project is “small”, in the sense that it 
affects global warming only marginally. Ecological benefits are therefore negligible 
compared to monetary payoffs, and may be ignored. 
                                                     
12 Throughout this paper, I only consider agreements characterized by “constant” distributions of the 
pie, meaning that each party gets the same payoff in every period of the enforcement stage (as long as 
both parties abide by the agreement). This means imposing a restriction on the bargaining set, since in 
practice, the parties might also consider “variable” distributions. It is obvious that this restriction might 
influence the bargaining solution, regardless of whether or not the agreement is enforced by the parties 
themselves. If the parties’ discount factors differ, both sides may benefit if a “constant” distribution is 
replaced with a “variable” one, which gives more to the relatively impatient party in early phases of the 
enforcement stage, and more to the relatively patient party in later phases. However, whether restricting 
the bargaining set to “constant” distributions has an impact on the effect of decentralized enforcement 
remains to be determined. 
13 As future benefits are being discounted, the parties can therefore be said to bargain over a shrinking 
pie. 
12 The countries have “almost perfect” information because both of them know the game’s history up 
to the current period, but neither country can observe the opponent’s move in the current period before 
it has to make his own decision. 
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  The game in Figure 1 obeys the definitional criteria of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. 
That the time horizon of the enforcement stage is infinite means that no matter how many 
times the game has already been played, there is always a positive probability that the game 
continues at least one more period. The game in Figure 1 is the constituent game of the larger, 
repeated game that makes up the enforcement stage. 
For simplicity, I assume that in each period of the enforcement stage, each side makes its 
move in ignorance of the decision made by the opponent. However, at the beginning of each 
period, the parties are assumed to know the history of the game up to that point. Moreover, 
payoffs and strategy sets are assumed to be common knowledge. The enforcement stage is, 
therefore, a game of complete and “almost perfect” information.15 
Some may object that for many types of CDM projects, it is more realistic to assume that 
the parties make their moves sequentially, rather than simultaneously. For example, the 
project may not be started until the payment has been made. In this case, only country I has a 
real chance of cheating, since if country C does not make the payment, it is unequivocally in 
country I’s best interest not to complete the project. Similarly, if the payment is not due until 
the project has been completed, only country C has a real chance of cheating. The 
implications of introducing sequential moves turns out to be straightforward, and will be 
briefly reviewed in the final section.  
As the constituent game of the enforcement stage is a Prisoners’ Dilemma, it follows that in 
the one-shot version of the game, it is a dominant strategy for each side to defect from the 
agreement. However, it is well known that in the infinitely repeated version of the game, 
compliance can be sustained if the parties apply appropriate strategies for the repeated game 
(e.g., Axelrod 1984, Shubik 1970, Taylor 1976, Taylor 1987).16 The question that concerns us 
here is what impact the enforcement stage has on the outcome of the bargaining stage. 
Figure 1: Payoff matrix for the enforcement stage 
  Country C 
  Pay Not pay 
Country I Implement X- CI , CC -X - CI , CC  
 Not implement X,-X 0,0 
 
4 Equilibrium 
The game can be solved by backwards induction. I therefore begin with the enforcement stage 
and then turn to the bargaining stage. 
4.1 The enforcement stage 
In the enforcement stage, the countries are simply assumed to use “grim” trigger strategies to 
punish a defection. As a consequence, any defection causes the agreement to be terminated. 
Let  j  (j=I,C) be the parties’ discount factors for the enforcement stage. These discount 
                                                     
13 With a small amount of the “right” sort of incomplete information, compliance can also be sustained 
in the finitely repeated game (Kreps et. al. 1982). 
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factors are assumed to satisfy 0< j <1.17 The motivation for introducing separate discount 
factors for the enforcement stage and for the bargaining stage is that the effect of discounting 
turns out to be different in the two stages (see below). 
It is straightforward to show that for compliance to be sustained, the following two 
conditions must be satisfied (see Appendix A for details):18 
(1a)  I   X
CI  
(1b) C   
CC
X  
Conditions (1a) and (1b) can be combined and re-written as 
(2) 
I
I
CC
CXC

   
Since C I < 
I
IC

 and CCC  < CC  (see Figure 2), condition (2) places real constraints on the size 
of the side payment X. It says that for compliance to be enforceable, the bargaining outcome 
must be better for each side than some minimum threshold. If the side payment is too small, 
then country I will not be induced to implement the project. If it is too large, then country C 
will decline to pay the side payment. Note that the smaller the discount factors of the parties, 
the more severe the constraints. Conversely, as the discount factors tend to one, condition (2) 
simply reduces to a requirement that both sides must be better off with than without the 
agreement, i.e., the agreement must be an element in the bargaining set. In short, the more 
patient the parties, the more room there is for negotiation about the size of the side payment. 
 
Figure 2. The bargaining set  
 
CI                
CI
I
                            X                              C CC                CC  
 
At this point, one might intuitively expect that if the S-R solution lies outside the interval 






CC
I
I C
C


, , then the need for decentralized enforcement will bring the outcome inside that 
interval (if only just). A second hypothesis that may seem intuitively reasonable is that if the 
S-R solution lies inside that interval, then the outcomes of the two models will be identical. It 
turns out that only the former intuition is correct. To see why, let us now turn to the 
bargaining stage. 
                                                     
14 Note that if a period in the enforcement stage is longer than a period in the bargaining stage (which 
is usually a reasonable assumption), then δj > ωj  (j=I,C).   
15 In other words, if these conditions are satisfied, then, in subgame perfect equilibrium, the parties 
comply in every period of the enforcement stage.   
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4.2 The bargaining stage 
I shall mainly consider two cases, which differ only in the time available for bargaining. I 
begin with the single-period case, and then proceed to the infinite-horizon case. Intermediate 
cases will also be mentioned briefly.  
4.2.1 Single-period bargaining 
In the single-period case, the entire process of “bargaining” is reduced to a simple ultimatum 
game. Country I offers a contract and country C must simply accept or reject country I’s 
proposal. If country C rejects, both sides receive a zero payoff, and there is no agreement to 
enforce. The solution of the single-period S-R model is that country I proposes 0x = CC , and 
that country C accepts.19 In other words, country I is able to secure (virtually) all of the gains 
from cooperation for itself. Hence, the game has a strong first-mover advantage.   
If, on the other hand, the contract must be enforced by the countries themselves, country I 
knows that even if country C were to consent to any side payment smaller than or equal to 
CC , it would not comply unless the agreement satisfies inequality (1b). Accordingly, country I 
rationally offers an agreement which only just passes this test. Assuming that inequalities (1a) 
and (1b) are satisfied, then, the solution of the game may be described as follows: 
I. At date 0, country I proposes 0x = CCC .  
II. Country C accepts this proposal. 
III. Both countries comply indefinitely. 
This equilibrium gives country C a payoff of V C :  
(3) V C  = 0xCC   = CC - CCC  
Similarly, country I obtains a payoff of V I : 
(4) V I  = ICx 0  = ICC CC   
Note that in the case of single-period bargaining, the inclusion of an enforcement stage 
provides country C (the second mover) with a larger share of the pie. There is still a first-
mover advantage in the model (provided that country C’s discount factor is sufficiently 
large),20 but the need for decentralized enforcement makes this advantage smaller than it is in 
the case with centralized enforcement. 
Figure 3 gives the solutions of the one- two-, three-, four- and five-period cases. For easy 
comparison, the corresponding equilibrium outcomes for the S-R model are given in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 In fact, to ensure a strict preference for country C, the side payment must be infinitesimally smaller 
than Cc.. For simplicity, differences of this kind will be ignored throughout. 
17 A first-mover advantage requires that country I’s payoff is larger than country C’s. In the single-
period bargaining case, this condition is satisfied if CCCICC CCCC   , i.e. if 
C
IC
C C
CC
2

  
. 
CICERO Working Paper 2001:12 
Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining, and the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 Figure 3: Equilibrium bargaining outcomes with decentralized enforcement 
No. of 
periods. 
Payoff for country I 
1 ICC CC   
2 
 )( IC CC 




	

I
I
CC
C
C

  
3 )()()( ICCICICCIC CCCCCC    
4 





	

I
I
CICICICICCIC
C
CCCCCCC


2)()()(  
5 )()()()()( 222 ICCICICICICICICCIC CCCCCCCCCC    
..... ….. 
 
IC
C




1
1  ( )IC CC   
 
Figure 4: Equilibrium Bargaining Outcomes in the S-R model 
No. of 
periods. 
Payoff for country I 
1 IC CC   
2  )( IC CC  ICC CC   
3 )()()( ICICICCIC CCCCCC    
4 
ICICICICCIC CCCCCC 
2)()()(   )( IC CC   
5 )()()()()( 222 ICICICICICICICCIC CCCCCCCCCC    
.... …. 
 
 IC
C




1
1  ( )IC CC   
 
 
4.2.2 Infinite-horizon bargaining 
Proofs for the two-period and three-period solutions in Figure 4 are given in Appendix B.21 
Here, I concentrate on the infinite-horizon case. Figure 5 shows the difference between the 
solutions of the two models for up to five periods in the bargaining game.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 The results of the S-R model are assumed to be well known. Interested readers are referred to 
Rubinstein (1982), Tirole (1988:430-431) or Fudenberg & Tirole (1991:113-117). 
19 If country C moves first in the enforcement stage, it is the other way around. 
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Figure 5: Difference in equilibrium bargaining outcome with and without 
decentralized enforcement 
No. of 
periods 
Payoff Difference for Country I  
1 CCC CC   
2 






 I
I
I
C C
C

  
3 (IC CCC CC  ) 
4 





	
 I
I
I
IC C
C


2  
5 (22 IC CCC CC  ) 
 
Let PMIV  denote the payoff to country I provided by the solution of the present model. 
Similarly, let SRIV  denote the payoff to country I provided by the S-R model. In general, we 
may then write the difference between the two solutions, in terms of country I’s payoff, as 
follows: 
k=uneven:  )(2
1
2
1
CCC
k
I
k
C
SR
I
PM
I CCVV 

 <0  
 
k=even:   022 




	

 I
I
I
k
I
k
C
SR
I
PM
I C
C
VV

     
Here k equals the number of periods in the bargaining stage. Notice that, as k becomes 
large, the right-hand side of (5) tends to zero. The same is true for the right-hand side of (6). 
In other words, as k tends to infinity, the bargaining solution in the case with decentralized 
enforcement converges to that of the S-R model. As indicated by Figures 3-4, this solution 
gives country I a payoff of 
IC
C




1
1  ( )IC CC  , which leaves 
IC
CI




1
)1( ( )IC CC   for country C. 
Before I turn to the discussion, one further comment is in order. So far, I have assumed that 
in the enforcement stage, the parties make their moves simultaneously in each period. As 
already noted, this assumption is not always realistic. It turns out, however, that the 
implications of relaxing this assumption are straightforward. With sequential moves in the 
enforcement stage, only the second mover has a real chance of cheating. The reason is that if 
the first mover cheats (does not pay or does not complete the project, depending on who the 
first mover is), then the second mover has no incentive to cooperate either. In this case, 
therefore, the enforcement stage no longer places two restrictions on the bargaining set (cf. 
figure 1), but only one. If country C moves last in the enforcement stage, then only the lower 
restriction is effective. If country I moves last, then only the upper restriction is effective. It 
can be shown that in the latter case, for k=even, the solution of the game with decentralized 
enforcement is the same as in the simultaneous move version of the game with decentralized 
enforcement. In contrast, when k is uneven, the solution is the same as in the S-R model.23 As 
the solutions with and without decentralized enforcement have already been shown to be 
identical if there are infinitely many rounds in the bargaining stage, it follows that this is also 
true in the case with sequential moves in the bargaining stage. 
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The intuition behind this conclusion may be explained as follows. The enforcement stage 
constrains the advantage of making the proposal in the final bargaining round.24 The nature of 
this constraint is to rule out extremely asymmetrical proposals. With sequential moves in the 
enforcement stage, the constraint is absent for one of the parties, namely the first mover in the 
enforcement stage. For example, suppose that country C moves first in the enforcement stage. 
In this case, country I need not worry that a very asymmetrical agreement will lead C to 
violate the agreement. Therefore the bargaining solution becomes more asymmetrical in 
country I’s favor, compared with the case where the parties move simultaneously in the 
enforcement stage. However, this is true only when  k is uneven, since it is only in these cases 
that country I gets to make the proposal in the final bargaining round. 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the impact on inter-state bargaining outcomes of decentralized 
enforcement, which is often typical for international cooperation. Using the Clean 
Development Mechanism as an example, I constructed a two-stage model in which a 
bargaining stage is followed by an enforcement stage once an agreement is concluded. While 
the enforcement stage was modeled as an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, the 
bargaining stage was pictured as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-Rubinstein type. 
To study the impact of the enforcement stage, equilibrium bargaining outcomes reached in the 
two-stage model were compared to those generated by the S-R model. This section elaborates 
on the differences between the results of the present model, those of the S-R model, and those 
of the Fearon model. 
As the present model is an extension of the S-R model, it is not surprising that there are 
both similarities and differences between the equilibrium outcomes of the two models. First, 
in both models it is advantageous to make the first proposal, i.e., to have agenda-setting 
power. This is most easily seen if we concentrate on the single-period case and the infinite-
horizon case (where the two solutions converge) and assume that the parties’ discount factors 
for the bargaining stage are identical (i.e.,   IC ). We have already seen that country I 
(the first mover) gets more than country C in the single-period case, provided that country C’s 
discount factor for the enforcement stage is sufficiently large.25 And it is easily verified that 
with an infinite horizon CI VV   for 1  (recall that in the above analysis, country I was 
invariably the party making the first proposal). 
However, with an even number of periods in the bargaining stage, country I is unlikely to 
get a larger payoff than country C, even if country I makes the first proposal. The reason for 
this is that in both models it is also advantageous to make the final proposal.26 It is intuitively 
plausible that the party making the final proposal has an advantage in the S-R model, since 
that party can always threaten to wait until the final period and then claim (virtually) the 
entire pie for itself. A similar (although generally smaller) advantage exists with decentralized 
enforcement as well. Consider the two-period case, where country C makes the proposal in 
                                                     
20 This explains why the enforcement stage has no impact on the solution in case with infinitely many 
rounds in the bargaining stage. The reason is that in this case, there is no final bargaining period. 
21Cf. footnote 14. Notice that the smaller the difference between Cc and CI , the higher ωc needs to 
be.  
22 Since it is an advantage both to make the first proposal and to make the final proposal, the best thing 
of all is to make both the first and the last proposal. Of course, this is only possible if the number of 
periods in the bargaining stage is uneven. 
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the final period.  In the S-R model, the difference between the payoff of country C and that of 
country I is )()(2 ICICC CCCC  , which is positive for 2/1C . With decentralized 
enforcement, the corresponding difference is )()(2 IC
I
I
CC CC
C
C 

 .  Given that 2/1C , the 
latter difference is also positive, but smaller than the former, as long as I  is sufficiently 
high.27  
A corollary to this result is that in both models it is a disadvantage to have the final move 
(i.e., to be the one who must accept or reject the final proposal). However, in my model, this 
disadvantage is less pronounced than in the S-R model. The explanation is that when there is 
a need for decentralized enforcement, the country having the final move can credibly point 
out that in order to be enforceable, an agreement must offer both sides a certain minimum 
payoff. Thus, with decentralized enforcement, country C gets a larger share of the pie than in 
the S-R model if the bargaining stage has an uneven number of periods (since country C is 
then the final mover). Similarly, country I gets a larger share of the pie with an even number 
of periods (as country I is then the final mover). 
Third, in the S-R model it is advantageous to be patient compared to the other party. For 
example, if in the infinite-horizon case I  tends to 1, while C  is kept constant between 0 and 
1, country I’s payoff tends to IC CC   (the entire pie). Similarly, if C  tends to 1, while I  is 
kept constant between 0 and 1, country I’s payoff tends to 0. In short, the more patient 
country I is, relative to country C, the larger country I’s share of the pie. However, an 
interesting feature of my model is that, while it is an advantage to be patient in the bargaining 
stage, it is a disadvantage to be patient in the enforcement stage. On this point, the present 
model concurs with Fearon’s. However, as Fearon pictures the bargaining stage as a War of 
Attrition, his model does not enable the analyst to study the impact of discounting on the 
distribution of the gains from cooperation. In this respect, the present model is richer. From 
(5) we see that country I’s payoff increases (and thus country C’s payoff decreases) as C  
increases. Similarly, we see from (6) that country I’s payoff decreases (meaning that country 
C’s payoff increases) as  I  increases. The intuition behind these results is that the more 
patient a party is in the enforcement stage, the larger its aggregate discounted payoff 
becomes. And the larger the aggregate payoff at stake, the more difficult it is to credibly 
threaten a breakdown of the negotiations. In short, the present model resembles Fearon’s in 
that getting more patient influences a party’s payoff in two ways. On the one hand, the payoff 
is affected positively via an increase in the discount factor for the bargaining stage. On the 
other hand, it is affected negatively through an increase in the discount factor for the 
enforcement stage. 
Finally, perhaps the most striking difference between the present model on the one hand, 
and the S-R model on the other, is that with decentralized enforcement, the bargaining 
outcome becomes more symmetrical. This is a second point that is overlooked by Fearon’s 
model, since that model admits only two possible agreements. It is also a surprising result. If 
anything, it would seem intuitively reasonable to expect the opposite effect. If it is entirely up 
to the parties themselves not only to reach agreement, but also to enforce that agreement, then 
intuition seems to suggest that bargaining power should play an even bigger role than in the 
case where any agreement can be costlessly enforced by a third party. However, the present 
model predicts the exact opposite result. To understand why, recall that the S-R model 
predicts extremely asymmetrical outcomes when the time available for bargaining is short. 
                                                     
23 Specifically, I  must be larger than
min
I , where 
min
I  is a threshold value that depends on the 
other parameters in the model. For example, if 9.0C , 2CC and ,1IC  then 
min
I 0.69.  
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Consider the case of single-period bargaining. In this case, the S-R model predicts that the 
party making the proposal gets (virtually) all of the gains from cooperation. However, that is 
no longer possible when the agreement must be enforced in a decentralized manner. In other 
words, the need for decentralized enforcement guarantees each side a minimal share of the 
pie. Granted, even with decentralized enforcement, the other side might consent to an 
extremely asymmetrical offer. However, such an agreement cannot be enforced. Therefore, 
any proposal must be adjusted so that the other side is induced not only to accept, but to 
comply as well. To obtain this requires that the proposal is made more symmetrical than it 
needs to be in the S-R model. In a context such as the CDM, where one would generally 
expect the industrial country to have a strong bargaining position, this seems to be good news 
(at least for developing countries). Surprisingly, this advantage is at least partially curbed if 
the agreement is enforced in a decentralized manner. Although this effect is particularly 
striking in the single-period bargaining case, it also holds with several periods in the 
bargaining stage. However, the longer the horizon of that stage, the smaller the impact on the 
bargaining outcome. As the horizon approaches infinity, the two solutions converge and the 
effect disappears altogether. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix demonstrates that conditions (1a) and (1b) in the above text hold. Consider the 
pair of “grim” trigger strategies for the enforcement stage ( IG , CG ), where the subscripts I and 
C refer to country I and country C, respectively: 
 
GI : In the first period, implement the project. In any subsequent period, implement the 
project if the outcome (implement, pay) has been sustained up to that period. Otherwise, do 
not implement. 
 
GC : In the first period, pay the agreed-upon sum. In any subsequent period, pay if the 
outcome (implement, pay) has been sustained up to that period. Otherwise, do not pay. 
 
If these strategies are used, implementation of further CDM projects is out of the question 
after a violation has occurred. Thus, each country obtains (at best) a zero payoff indefinitely 
from then on.  
Assuming that the parties’ discount factors for the enforcement stage are  I  and C  
(0< j <1), respectively, we find that country I’s expected utility from pursuing GI , given 
that country C pursues GC , is as follows: 
 
(A1)
I
I
IIIIICII
CXCXCXCXGGEU





1
...)()()():( 2   
 
Alternatively, country I can choose not to implement at a particular stage. Since this is an 
infinitely repeated game, it is of no consequence here whether this happens at the first stage or 
at a later stage. In both cases, the parties would be confronting exactly the same infinite series 
of stages in the continuation game (i.e., after a violation has occurred).  
Note that after country I has chosen “not implement” in a given period, its best option in 
the continuation game, given that country C pursues GC , is to choose “not implement” in all 
subsequent periods as well. Call this strategy DI .28 By using DI , then, country I obtains a 
payoff of X in the period in which the violation takes place, and then (at best) zero in each 
subsequent period. Thus, the expected utility of using DI , given that country C uses GC , is 
simply 
 
(A2) XGDEU CII ):(   
 
                                                     
28 If “not implement” is prescribed already at the first stage, then DI  is equivalent to “Do not 
implement, regardless of country C’s behavior. 
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This means that GI  is preferred to DI  (in other words, it pays to implement the project in 
every period) if 
 
(A3) XCX
I
I



1
 
 
 Solving for I  gives: 
 
(A4) I  X
CI   
 
Note that condition (A4) is identical to condition (1a) in the main text. 
In the same way, we find that the expected utility to country C from following GC , given 
that country I pursues GI , is as follows: 
(A5)
C
C
ICC
XC
GGEU



1
):(  
Moreover, given that country I pursues GI , not paying provides a payoff of CC  in the 
period where the defection occurs, and then (at best) zero in each subsequent period. Suppose 
the defection occurs already in the first period. The above strategy is then equivalent to 
“Always defect, regardless of Implementor’s behavior”. Call this strategy DC . We then have: 
 
(A6) CICC CGDEU ):(  
 
Accordingly, country C prefers GC  to CD  (i.e., it prefers to comply rather than to defect) 
provided that 
 
(A7) C
C
C C
XC



1
 
 
Solving forC  gives: 
  
(A8)
C
C C
X
   
 
Condition (A8) is identical to condition (1b). 
If both conditions (A4) and (A8) are fulfilled, then the strategy combination ( CI GG , ) is a 
Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game. This equilibrium is subgame perfect, as the 
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two strategies are also in equilibrium after a violation has occurred. After a violation, GI  
instructs country I to choose “not implement” indefinitely. For country C, it is then a best 
response to choose “not pay” indefinitely. But this is exactly what GC  instructs country C to 
do. Conversely, choosing “not implement” indefinitely is a best response for country I, given 
that country C chooses “not pay” indefinitely after a violation.  
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Appendix B 
This appendix derives the bargaining solutions given in Figure 3 for the two- and three-period 
cases with decentralized enforcement. 
First, consider the case with two periods in the bargaining stage. At date 0 country I 
proposes a side payment 0x , and country C accepts or rejects that proposal. If the parties are 
unable to agree at date 0, so that the game proceeds to date 1, then country C makes an offer 
1x , whereas Country I accepts or refuses. If date 1 is reached, the remainder of the game is 
completely analogous to the one-period case, the only difference being that the roles have 
been switched. Thus, should the bargaining proceed to date 1, then country C suggests 1x  = 
C I
I
, which is then the smallest acceptable and enforceable side payment. If accepted, this 
proposal would give country C a (periodic) payoff of 
I
I
C
C
C

 . Accordingly, country I knows 
that at date 0, the smallest payoff that country C is going to settle for is 






I
I
CC
C
C

 , which is 
in effect what country I offers. This means that the agreed-upon side payment is 0x  
= CC  






I
I
CC
C
C

 .  This leaves country I with a payoff of  )( IC CC 






I
I
CC
C
C

 . 
 
I now turn to the three-period game. In this case, country I makes a proposal at date 0, and 
country C accepts or rejects. If country C rejects, it makes a second proposal at date 1, and 
country I accepts or rejects. If it rejects, country I gets to make a final proposal at date 2, 
which country C must then either accept or reject. 
Should the final period be reached, the remainder of the game is identical to the single-
period case, and thus country I suggests the largest side payment which is both acceptable and 
possible to enforce. This is 2x CCC . 
We already know from the single-period bargaining case that this would give country I a 
payoff of CCC CC   and country C a payoff of ICC CC  . At date 1, country C proposes the 
smallest enforceable side payment that country I is willing to accept at that time. This is the 
amount that makes accepting at date 1or waiting until date 2 equally attractive options to 
country I. In other words, country C sets 1x so that V I ( 1x ) = )( ICCI CC  . If this had been 
the final agreement, then country C would obtain )()( ICCIIC CCCC   . At date 0, the 
largest enforceable side payment that country C is willing to accept must be the amount that 
makes accepting or waiting until date 1 equally attractive options to country C. This means 
that country I rationally determines 0x  so that country C gets a payoff of 
)()( ICCICICC CCCC   . In turn, this requires that the side payment must be 
0x )()( ICCICICCC CCCCC   , which in effect is what country I proposes. That leaves 
the payoff )()()( ICCICICCIC CCCCCC   for country I. 
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Appendix C 
This appendix offers a brief description of an incomplete information version of the above 
model. Assume that when the game starts, country I is uncertain about the true value of 
country C’s discount parameter for the enforcement stage,C . For concreteness, assume that 
C  is either ”high” or ”low”. With probability 1-q,C =C
H , whereas with probability q, 
C =C
L  , where 1>C
H >C
L >0. As before, all other parameters in the model are assumed to 
be common knowledge. The question is what impact this type of incomplete information has 
on the bargaining outcome. 
For simplicity, I concentrate on the single-period bargaining case. If country I had been 
certain that C =C
H , it would have offered x CC
H
C0   , whereas if it had been certain that 
C =C
L , it would have offered x CC
L
C0   . With incomplete information, however, 
country I faces a risky choice. On the one hand, country I has the option of proposing 
x CC
L
C0   , which would be accepted with certainty (regardless of the true value of C ) 
and lead to indefinite compliance by both countries. On the other hand, it might propose 
x CC
H
C0   . In this case country C would also accept the offer with certainty, since it has 
nothing to lose by doing this. However, it would comply only if C =C
H . By contrast, 
ifC =C
L , country C defects from the first period in the enforcement stage. It follows that 
the two options generate the following expected utility for country I: 
 
(C1)  ICHCICHCI CCqCqCxEU  )1()()( 0 = ICHC CqC  )1(  
 
(C2) ICLCCLCI CCCxEU   )( 0  
 
Neglecting the special case of indifference, country I rationally proposes the higher side 
payment, i.e., x CC
H
C0   , if and only if the right-hand side of (C1) is larger than the right-
hand side of (C2). This condition is satisfied if 
 
(C3)
qLC
H
C


1
1

  
 
Thus, country I is more likely to propose the higher side payment, 
 
 the larger C
H  is, compared to C
L , and 
 the larger 1-q is, i.e., the larger the probability that C’s true discount parameter 
for the enforcement stage is C
H . 
If (C3) holds, the game has a separating equilibrium in which country I proposes 
x CC
H
C0    and country C accepts regardless of its type. However, in the enforcement stage 
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both parties comply only if C =C
H . Otherwise, country C defects in the first period of the 
enforcement stage, whereas country I complies. From then on, both parties defect indefinitely. 
On the other hand, if (C3) does not hold, the game has a pooling equilibrium, in which 
country I proposes x CC
L
C0   . Regardless of its type, country C accepts the proposal, and 
both sides comply indefinitely. 
This model admits the possibility that in equilibrium the parties may renege on a previously 
reached agreement after some initial compliance. This provides an important difference 
between the incomplete information version and its complete information counterpart. In the 
latter model, both parties will always either comply indefinitely or defect from the very first 
stage in the enforcement stage. 
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